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LAW REVIEW
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STATE JUDICIAL POWER:
A SEPARATION OF POWERS PERSPECTIVE
MICHAEL P. COX*
During the celebration of the American Bicentennial, Erwin N.
Griswold, former Solicitor General of the United States and former
Dean of the Harvard Law School, remarked that "the notion that
every controversy should be resolved in the courts, and every reform
should be achieved in the courts"' should be countered. His sugges-
tion echoed the comments made a year earlier by then President
Gerald R. Ford:
[W]e are turning too often to the courts for solutions to conflicts that
should have been tackled by other agencies of the ... Government or
even the private sector. We cannot expect the Judiciary to resolve and
to balance all of our opposing views in our society. Neither can we rely
on the courts as the sole protector of our individual liberties. I think
other agencies or partners in the... Government have an equal respon-
sibility. We can't, in all honesty, put the full burden and total load on
the judicial system.
2
Such observations are not new. Almost one hundred fifty years ago,
Alexis de Tocqueville concluded after his travels through the United
States that "scarcely any question arises in the United States which
does not become, sooner or later, a subject of judicial debate." 3 The
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Griswold, The Legal Profession in the United States: A Contemporary Appraisal, in
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY: ENGLISH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES COMPARED 146 (H.W. Jones
ed. 1977). This volume collects the papers commissioned by the American Bar Association for
the program "Common Faith and Common Law," presented at its annual meeting in Atlanta,
Ga., in August, 1976.
1 President's Address, Sixth Circuit Judicial Conference, Mackinac Island, Mich. (July
13, 1975), reprinted in Presidential Documents: Gerald R. Ford, 1975, p. 747. The comments by
the President specifically addressed the federal courts and the federal government but are equally
applicable to state courts and state government.
A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, ch. 16 at 284 (H. Reeve trans. 1899).
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concern, however, has not been limited to what may be described
loosely as the increase in "judicial" functions. In recent years
scholars4 and judges5 have raised the issue to what extent judiciaries
should be, and are being, affected by so-called "nonjudicial" func-
tions.
The extent to which state judiciaries should be committed to
resolving controversies, providing solutions to conflicts, and imple-
menting social policy is affected not only by practical considerations
(e.g., allocation of judicial resources, possibility of disqualifying pre-
judice, and reduction of judicial dignity and esteem), but also by the
principle of separation of powers. These concerns were raised by
Harlan Fiske Stone, when, as Chief Justice of the United States, he
declined to serve in a capacity that Franklin D. Roosevelt thought to
be "wholly ethical work" 6 for the President of the United States to re-
quest the Chief Justice to perform:
[A] judge and especially a Chief Justice, cannot engage in political
debate or make public defense of his acts. When his action is judicial,
he may always rely upon the support of the defined record upon which
his action is based and of the opinion in which he and his associates
unite as stating the ground of decision. But when he participates in the
action of the executive or legislative departments of government he is
without those supports. He exposes himself to attack and indeed invites
it, which because of his peculiar situation, inevitably impairs his value
as a judge and the appropriate influence of his office.7
I See, e.g., McKay, The Judiciary and Nonjudicial Activities, 35 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 9 (1970). The former Dean of New York University School of Law, although cautioning
against overreaction and cloistering of the judiciary, warned that judges must guard against:
"(1) participation in outside activities so extensive that the time and energy available
for the primary obligation are measurably impaired;
"(2) participation in out-of-court activities that may lead to actual bias or the ap-
pearance of prejudgment of issues ... ; and
"(3) actions that impair the dignity and esteem in which the court should be held." Id.
al 12.
, See, e.g., De Bruler, Non-Judicial Duties of Indiana Trial Judges, 3 IND. L. FORUM 1
(1969). The chief justice of the Indiana Supreme Court observed that "non-judicial functions of
the trial judge consume much of his time and energy and siphon off extra creative energy which
the judge might have used in deciding a case, improving the internal operation of his court, or
continuing his legal education," with a resultant effect that the "ability of the electorate to select
a judge upon the basis of his in-court conduct is hampered by the involvement of the judge in
non-judicial activities." Id. at 7, 12.
' Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone (July 17, 1942),
reprinted in Mason, Extra-Judicial Work for Judges: The View of Chief Justice Stone, 67 HARV.
L. REv. 193, 202 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Mason]. The President had requested the Chief
Justice's assistance in settling a controversy that had arisen concerning the management of the
nation's rubber supply.
' Letter from Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone to Franklin D. Roosevelt (July 20, 1942),
reprinted in Mason, supra note 6, at 203, 204. Chief Justice Stone, as one of the most vocal
opponents of assigning nonjudicial governmental functions to the judiciary, also opposed
[Vol. 34:207
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In the context of judicial power, the distinction between a person
as an individual and as a judge, as well as the differentiation between
the responsibility of a judge and that of a court, arguably is not
significant. As Benjamin Cardozo recognized more than fifty years
ago as Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals: "The prohibi-
tions of the constitution are not to be evaded through the form of
accepting as an individual what the judge must reject. At least that is
so when what is done is official and not personal in its quality and
incidents." 8 Although technical refinements can be made between
judges and courts, 9 and legislatures have defined "judge" and
"court" in particular contexts,"0 the semantic distinction between
attempts by Congress to enlist his aid in duties he felt to be outside the scope of propriety. For
example, Congress considered forming a War Ballot Commission whose members would be ap-
pointed by the Chief Justice. Chief Justice Stone was not only successful in having this legisla-
tion altered but he also headed off a move to name him as head of the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion. Mason, supra note 6, at 217, 218. Stone apparently found nothing objectionable, however,
to other statutory duties assigned to the office of Chief Justice: see, e.g., member of the Board
of Regents of the Smithsonian Institute (20 U.S.C. § 42 (1976)) and member of the Board of
Trustees of the National Gallery of Art (20 U.S.C. § 72 (1976)). Letter from Bennett Boskey,
former law clerk to Chief Justice Stone, to Professor Alpheus T. Mason (Dec. 18, 1953),
reprinted in Hearings on Non-judicial Activities of the Supreme Court Justices and Other
Federal Judges Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 224-25 (1969).
In contrast to Chief Justice Stone, Judge John J. Parker was perhaps the most eloquent
defender of such activities: "I am not one of those who think that a man ceases to be a man and
a citizen when he becomes a judge and would have him retire from life as though he were enter-
ing a monastery.... To him much has been entrusted by the people. They have a right to expect
much of him, not only in the performance of his judicial duties, but also in the way of intellec-
tual leadership .... [There] is no reason why he should not play a full part of a leader in our
democracy." Parker, The Judicial Office of the United States, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 225, 225
(1948). As Judge Parker felt that "when a call comes for a judge to do something for his coun-
try, which no one but a judge can do so well, he should not hesitate to undertake it," he defended
acceptance by United States Supreme Court Justices of extrajudicial activities. Miller, Public
Confidence in the Judiciary: Some Notes and Reflections, 35 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 69, 80
(1970).
. In re Richardson, 247 N.Y. 401, 160 N.E. 655, 662 (1928). Accord, Opinion of the
Justices, 365 Mass. 639, 309 N.E.2d 476, 480 (1974); Local 170 v. Gadola, 322 Mich. 332, 34
N.W.2d 71, 77-78 (1948).
' See, e.g., Baumgaertel v. Salt Lake County, 560 P.2d 325, 327 (Utah 1977) (distinc-
tion made in the context of UTAH CONST. art. 8, § 15, which prohibits employment or appoint-
ment of a relative by a "judge of any court"): "The term 'court' connotes a governmental insti-
tution in which is vested the judicial power of the State. The concept of a court is much broader
than that of a judge. In essence, a 'court' is a tribunal, authorized by law, at the appropriate
time and place, to administer justice; a 'judge' is an officer or member of such tribunal. This
concept is reflected in Deutsch v. Fairfield [27 Ariz. 387, 233 P. 887, 890 (1925)], wherein the
court stated: 'When we speak of a court we think of the presiding judge, a clerk, parties, and at-
torneys, and while all of these are not necessary to constitute the court, neither is the judge alone
the court.' " See also Commonwealth ex rel. Ward v. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41, 98 S.W.2d 53,
55-56 (1936); Exparte Lowery, 518 S.W.2d 897, 901-902 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
"1 See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUn. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1-101 (1980); N.Y. GEN. CONS. LAW §
26 (McKinney Supp. 1980).
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"judge" and "court" loses much of its significance when separation
of powers is the issue addressed. 1 If a violation of separation of
powers occurs when a function is performed by a judge, one can argue
that the violation persists if the performance is lodged in the institu-
tion of a court.
In analyzing state judicial power from the perspective of separa-
tion of powers, one should consider the origins of the principle as well
as its operation in the United States, including interpretation questions
that have arisen in its application. Once this has been done, "judicial
power" as an element of the separation of powers principle can be ad-
dressed directly.
The American Constitutional Experience
When the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia in 1787
to revise the Articles of Confederation (which had not utilized the con-
cept of separation to any great extent), the division of power into three
branches was viewed by the participants as one of the vehicles to
rehabilitate the Articles.' 2 The delegates to the Convention had be-
fore them not only the writings of the Classicists,' 3 Locke, 14 Montes-
11 As th.e Arkansas Supreme Court in Patton v. Vaughan, 39 Ark. 211, 214 (1882),
observed, at least where a court consisted of a single judge, when "the law requires a duty to be
performed by the judge of a court, . . . it suffices if the duty be performed by the court, since
the act of the court is necessarily the act of the judge." But cf. Bergen County Sewer Auth. v.
Borough of Little Ferry, 5 N.J. 548, 76 A.2d 680, 681-82 (1950): "The statutory jurisdiction is
not conferred upon the court as such but upon the individual judges thereof, designalio per-
sonae, who act in exercising it solely in the capacity of legislative agents exercising a delegated
authority. . . . The appointment of condemnation commissioners is not a function of the
Superior Court but of a judge thereof acting as a designated legislative agent."
2 Wright, The Origins of Separation of Powers in America, 13 ECONOMIA 169, 179
(1933).
" See, e.g., Plato, Statesman and Laws, reprinted in 2 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO (Ran-
dom House ed. 1937); Aristotle, POLITICS, Bk. III, Bk. IV (ch. 14), reprinted in BASIC WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE (McKeon-Random House ed. 1941); G. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY
154 (1950); W. DUNNING, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES, ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL 113
(1902), discussing the writings of Polybius. Although Aristotle did discuss the separate functions
of deliberative, magisterial, and judicative, Arthur T. Vanderbilt, in the Roscoe Pound Lectures
presented in 1952 at the University of Nebraska, submitted that Aristotle's delineation of these
functions is not the origin of separation of powers as known today, but rather a description of
the "functions necessarily exercised by the sovereign body however constituted. He [Aristotle]
laid no stress on whether they should be separated in their operation." A. VANDERBILT, THE
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE 38-39 (1953).
For a di:;cussion of the development of the doctrine of separation of powers during the
period between the Classicists and the seventeenth century, see Fairlie, The Separation of
Powers, 21 MICH. L. REV. 393 (1922); Bondy, The Separation of Governmental Powers, 5
STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW (No. 2) 7, 7-12 (1896); J. GREEN, A SHORT
HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE 66, 607, 685 (1897); P. CONKIN, SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS 143-57
(1974). See also Tite v. State Tax Comm'n, 89 Utah 404, 57 P.2d 734, 735-37 (1936).
" See, e.g., Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil




quieu,1s and Blackstone,1 6 as well as the Settlement Act of 1701,17 but
also had firsthand knowledge, according to James Madison, that "ex-
perience in all states'has evinced a powerful tendency in the legislature to
absorb all power into its vortex. This was the real source of danger to the
American Constitutions; and suggested the necessity of giving every
defensive authority to the other departments that was consistent with
republican principles.""8
When the Convention convened, six of the original states had in-
cluded in their state constitutions express separation of powers
clauses.' 9 Attention to Madison's concern was specifically reflected in
the Journal of the Convention for Framing a Constitution of Govern-
ment (Mass. Bay): "The protection of the independence of the
judiciary was the exclusive purpose of the original draft of the
Massachusetts separation of powers clause . . . [which] read as
follows: 'The judicial department of the State ought to be separate
from, and independent of, the legislative and executive powers.' "20
Between January 30 and February 8, 1788, James Madison discussed
in five papers of The Federalist2 the way in which separation of
powers should be approached in the Federal Constitution. After a
review of the experiences of the states in fragmenting governmental
power, he concluded that "a mere demarkation on parchment of the
constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a sufficient
guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concen-
tration of all powers of government in the same hands." ' 22 He went on
to discuss separation of powers and the Federal Constitution:
To what expedient then shall we finally resort for maintaining in prac-
tice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as
laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is,
MINISTRATIVE LAW 2 (1932); J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, Bk. II, ch. 6 (1689),
discussed in Fairlie, The Separation of Powers, 21 MICH. L. REv. 393, 396 (1922).
S See, e.g., C. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 152 (Nugent ed. 1823).
16 See, e.g., W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 259-60 (1765).
" In 1701, Parliament passed the Act of Settlement, which, by setting the foundation of
the English judicial system, created a judiciary independent of the executive. For further discus-
sion, see Ervin, Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 108,
111 (1970), quoted in ZyIstra v. Piva, 85 Wash. 2d 743, 539 P.2d 823, 829-30 (1975) (concurring
opinion), wherein an extensive discussion of separation of powers is presented.
" F. GREEN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC STATES
(1776-1860) 103 (1966 ed.) (source of quote is not identified).
1x v. DOUGLAS, THE ANATOMY OF LIBERTY, THE RIGHTS OF MAN WITHOUT FORCE 54
(1963).
20 Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 639, 309 N.E.2d 476, 480 n.5 (1974), quoting from
J. OF THE CONVENTION FOR FRAMING A CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT (Mass. Bay) (1779-1780) at
197. See generally 2 MAss. L.Q. (No. 5) 383-93 (1917).
21 THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47-51 (J. Madison).
22 THE FEDERALISr No. 48 (J. Madison), at 338 (Wesleyan U. Press ed. 1961).
1981]
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that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the
defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of
government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual
relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places....
[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who admin-
ister each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal
motives, to resist encroachments of the others. . . . Ambition must be
made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be con-
nected with the constitutional rights of the place."
As a consequence of these concerns, the United States Constitution (as
well as a number of state constitutions) do not contain a clause ex-
pressly separating the powers of government, but the "same result is
reached because these other states' constitutions, as the federal con-
stitution, c:reate three departments of government, vesting the exe-
cutive power in one, the legislative power in another, and the judicial
power in a third."
2 4
The overwhelming majority of state constitutions, however, do con-
tain specific separation of powers clauses. 2 These provisions implement
the concept by (1) separating the powers of government into three branch-
es; (2) forbidding performance of the powers of one branch by another; or
(3) prohibiting a person in one department from performing the powers of
another department. Although some state constitutions explicitly only
separate the powers into executive, legislative, and judicial2' or only
specifically forbid one branch performing another branch's power 27 (or
23 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison), at 347-49 (Wesleyan U. Press ed. 1961).
24 W. DouGLAs, THE ANATOMY OF LIBERTY, THE RIGHTS OF MAN WITHOUT FORCE 54
(1963). For example, see Kilbourne v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881); State ex rel. Finley,
Judge v. Pfieffer, 163 Ohio St. 149, 126 N.E.2d 57, 61 (1955); In re Salary of Juvenile Director,
87 Wash. 2d 232, 552 P.2d 163 (1976); Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wash. 2d 743, 539 P.2d 823, 829-30
(1975) (concurring opinion): "Washington is among those states which recognize the separation
of powers theory by vesting in its constitution the 'judicial power of the state' in a separate
branch of government.... We have recognized and applied the doctrine .... In furtherance of
the principle of separation of powers we have refused to interfere with the executive branch of
government, or with the legislative branch, and insisted that those branches do not usurp the
functions of this one. [Citations omitted.]"
2" For a collection of all state constitutions, see CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES,
NATIONAL AND SrZATE (2d ed. 1974). The state constitutions, as currently amended, are contained
in volumes 1-5, while Volume 6 collects documents pertaining to dependencies of the United
States.
26 See, e.g., N.C. Co NT. art. 1, § 6: "The legislative, executive and supreme judicial
powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other."
27 See, e.g., MAss. CONT. pt. 1, art. 30: "In the government of this commonwealth, the
legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them:
The executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the
[Vol. 34:207
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both28 ), most jurisdictions combine a separation of powers with a pro-
scription of personal conduct.29 These personal proscriptions normally
include an exception such as "unless otherwise provided in this constitu-
tion."3" The preclusions of one branch from performing the powers of
judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it
may be a government of laws and not of men."
2 See, e.g., ILL. CoNsT. art. 2, § I: "The legislative, executive, and judicial branches are
separate. No branch shall exercise power properly belonging to another."
29 See, e.g., MICH. CONsr. art. 3, § 2: "The powers of government are divided into three
branches; legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall
exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this con-
stitution," and GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2, 4, infra at note 30; however, W. VA. CONsT. art. 5. § 1
(infra at note 30) and LA. CONSr. art. 2 combine all three approaches-separation of powers,
prohibition as regards the branches of government, and proscription in terms of personal con-
duct. In 1970, Illinois adopted a new constitution and in doing so changed the separation of
powers clause as written in the Illinois constitution of 1870. The present provision (supra at note
28) deleted the proscription of personal conduct. ILL. CONsT. art. 2, § 1 (Constitution Comment-
ary) (Smith-Hurd 1971) indicates that the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention "did not in-
tend to effect a change in the common law developed around Article III of the 1870 Constitu-
tion." In 1974 the Illinois Supreme Court indicated that the 1970 provision was "essentially the
same" as that of 1870. City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Bd., 57 Ill. 2d 170, 311 N.E.2d
146, 147 (1974). On the other hand, other states have revised their separation of powers clauses
to include the personal proscription. See, e.g., MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 8 (infra
at note 30). In 1974 the Maryland Court of Appeals observed that the "only difference between
that provision and Art. 6 of the Declaration of Rights in the Constitution of 1776 ... is the pro-
hibition against a person's exercising the functions of one of those departments assuming or
discharging the duties of any other. This clause was added in the Constitution of 1851 and left
unchanged in the Constitutions of 1864 and 1867." State ex rel. Sonner v. Shearin, 272 Md. 502,
325 A.2d 573, 577 (1974). The Michigan Supreme Court in 1968 discussed the development of
that state's separation of powers provision (MICH. CONsr. art. 3, § 2, supra) and related, inter
alia, that the "separation of powers article (Art. III) in the Constitution of 1835 did not
specifically proscribe individual conduct since it asserted that one department shall never exercise
the powers of another department. . . . The separation of powers article (Art. III) of the 1850
Constitution cast the proscription in terms of personal conduct by providing that no person
belonging to one department shall exercise the powers properly belonging to another except in
the cases expressly provided in this constitution. The word cases as there used had the same
meaning as situations or conditions." (Emphasis added.) Buback v. Romney, 380 Mich. 209, 156
N.W.2d 549, 556 (1968). The personal proscription has been continued in subsequent revisions
of the Michigan constitution. See infra note 30.
11 See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2, 4: "The legislative, judicial, and executive powers
shall forever remain separate and distinct, and no person discharging the duties of one, shall, at
the same time, exercise the functions of either of the others, except as herein provided," and
MICH. CONST. art. 3, § 2, supra note 29. The Michigan Supreme Court discussed in 1968 the
rewording of its provision so as to remove a possible interpretation problem: "Under the 1908
Constitution [the 1908 separation of powers clause was the same as in the 1850 constitution; see
supra note 29], the exception read 'except in the cases expressly provided [emphasis supplied].'
Now the exception reads 'except as expressly provided in this constitution [emphasis supplied].'
This change removes the doubt as to what was a case or situation intended to be covered as an
exception by language found elsewhere in the 1908 Constitution. The language now means that
the exception must be expressed in the Constitution itself, whereas the language of the 1908 Con-
stitution could have been construed to mean the legislature might deal with 'the situation' as be-
ing an exception. Under the 1963 Constitution, the language makes it clear that the exception
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1981
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another also are not written in absolute terms but allow for exceptions., I
In the few state constitutions that do not explicitly address separation of
powers, provision is often made, either in the judicial article of the con-
stitution3 2 or by statute,33 for protection of judicial independence.
Before administrative agencies could attain their current per-
vasiveness, a rethinking of separation of powers had to occur. This
reconsideration is evident if nineteenth- and twentieth-century judicial
opinions are compared. The older cases reflect a more rigid view of
separation of powers than do recent decisions 4.3  The Supreme Judicial
relates to the crossing over from one branch to another in the exercise of powers. Consequently,
where the legislature is authorized to act, it is required to conform to the separation of powers
concept as being fundamental and basic and may grant an exception only when it can find
authorization in the Constitution.... Therefore the separation of powers article would apply to
a court as follows: No person (a judge) exercising powers (judicial power) of one branch (the
court of justice which constitutes the judicial branch) shall exercise powers properly belonging to
another branch. It then becomes necessary to look for an exception (expressly provided) in the
Constitution,'" Bruback v. Romney, 380 Mich. 209, 156 N.W.2d 549, 556-57 (1968). But cf. MD.
CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 8: "That the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of
Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other; and no person exercising
the functions ef one of said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other" (em-
phasis added), which allows no exceptions and is written in absolute terms; and W. VA. CONST.
art. 5, § 1, which may, by providing only one exception, exclude any others: "The Legislative,
Executive and Judicial Departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither shall exercise
the powers properly belonging to either of the others; norshall anyperson exercise thepowers of
more than one of them at the same time, except that justices of the peace shall be eligible to the
Legislature" (emphasis added). Query: If a separation of powers provision does not include an
"unless hereinafter provided" clause, does a subsequent amendment, inconsistent with the con-
cept, override the separation of powers provision? See notes 41 to 45, infra.
" See, e.g., ARIz. CONST. art. 3: "The powers of the government of the State of
Arizona shall be divided into three separate departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the
Judicial; and, except as provided in this Constitution, such departments shall be separate and
distinct, and no one of such departments shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either
of the others." See also ALA. CONST. art. 3, § 43; LA. CONST. art. 2, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. 4.
Compare the query, supra note 30.
32 See, e.g., N.D. CONST. art. 4, § 94: "No duties shall be imposed by law upon the
Supreme Court or any of the judges thereof, except as are judicial, nor shall any of the judges
thereof exercise any powers of appointment except as herein provided."
,1 See, e.g., HAw. REv. STAT. tit. 32, § 601-5 (1976): "The judiciary department and the
several judges and other judicial officers thereof shall be independent of both the executive and
legislative departments. The governor shall have no power to interfere with, alter, or overrule
any order, writ, judgment, or decision of any court, judge or other judicial officer, except in the
exercise of power to grant reprieves and pardons in pursuance of law."
", For example, at the turn of the century, counsel observed in Board of Supervisors v.
Todd, 97 Md. 247, 248-49 (1903): "The principle of the separation of governmental powers was
laid down by Montesquieu .... Notwithstanding the very general acceptance of the principle by
the constitutional lawmaking bodies, judicial interpretation has given a wide divergence to the
force of its apptication in the various States. In some jurisdictions, a philosophical accuracy has
impelled the courts to lay much stress upon the principle, to construe strictly the constitutional
expression of it, and to regard it as one of the inalienable and unalterable safeguards of liberty....
In other states, again, the principle has been brushed aside with a judicial wave of the arm, as
expressing a fine distinction too theoretical to merit serious consideration. In determining the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol34/iss2/2
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Court of Massachusetts in 1974 noted, for example, that pro-
nouncements had been made, such as "[tihese limitations, though
sometimes difficult of application, must be scrupulously observed," 35
and the "court is ever solicitous to maintain the sharp division be-
tween the three departments of government. 3 6 Nevertheless, the jus-
tices recognized that
an absolute division of the three general types of functions is neither
possible nor always desirable. The growth in this century of administra-
tive agencies, called by some a "fourth branch" of government, has
sometimes tended to obscure the admittedly indistinct boundary lines
between the three branches and led some courts to adopt such descrip-
tions of "quasi-judicial" or "quasi-legislative." Scholars in this field
particularly have questioned the strict application of the doctrine. Pro-
fessor Jaffe argues that complete exclusiveness is absurd as functions
cannot be classified executive, legislative, or judicial so clearly. He
views the logic of separation of powers as polarity rather than strict
classification. Professor Davis urges that the true principle is not the
separation of three kinds of power but a system of checks to prevent
undue concentration of power. 7 [Citations omitted.]
Relaxation of the separation of powers concept, though arguably
stimulated initially by a desire and need for expansion of administra-
tive agencies, has been noticeable in settings other than that of public
administration. 38 From the perspective of the judicial branch, the
value of decisions cited upon the specific point in issue from States other than our own, it will be
imperative, therefore, to examine closely the judicial tendency in such States in relation to the
broad principle." See also State v. Hutt, 2 Ark. 282, 285-86 (1840); Ponder v. Graham, 4 Fla.
23, 42-43 (1951); State ex rel. Young v. Duval County, 76 Fla. 180, 79 So. 692, 697 (1918); Mc-
Cutcheon v. Smith, 199 Ga. 685, 35 S.E.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1945); City of Waukegan v. Pollution
Control Bd., 57 Ill. 2d 170, 311 N.E.2d 146, 147 (1974); Hill v. Relyer, 34 Il. 2d 552, 216
N.E.2d 795, 798 (1966); Field v. People ex rel. McClearand, 3 Ill. (2 Scrim.) 79, 83-84 (1839);
Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisors of Assessments, 276 Md. 36, 343 A.2d 521, 527 (1975); Department
of Natural Resources v. Linchester, 274 Md. 211, 334 A.2d 514, 521 (1974); Johnson v. Kramer
Bros. Freight Lines, Inc., 357 Mich. 254, 98 N.W.2d 586, 588 (1959); Dearborn Twp. v. Dial,
334 Mich. 673, 55 N.W.2d 201, 205 (1952); Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d
275, 279 (1973); State ex rel. Patterson v. Bates, 96 Minn. 110, 104 N.W. 709, 711-12 (1905); In
re Application of the Senate, 10 Minn. 78, 80 (Gil. 56, 57) (1865); State Bd. of Insurance v.
Betts, 156 Tex. 83, 308 S.W.2d 846, 852 (1958); State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, -W.
Va.-, 214 S.E.2d 467, 477 (1975); State ex rel. Sahley v. Thompson, 151 W. Va. 336, 151
S.E.2d 870, 873 (1966); State ex rel. Richardson v. County Court, 138 W. Va. 885, 78 S.E.2d
569, 577 (1953).
, Opinion of the Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807, 818 (1939).
36 Attorney Gen'l v. Brissenden, 271 Mass. 172, 171 N.E. 82, 87 (1930).
" Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 639, 309 N.E.2d 476, 478 (1974).
" One line of argument that has been utilized by state courts on a number of occasions
to relax the requirements of separation of powers not only with respect to administrative agen-
cies, but also in other areas is illustrated by Florida Motor Lines v. Railway Comm'rs, 100 Fla.
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development of administrative agencies can be viewed as a negative en-
croachment on judicial powers-a diminution of functions.3 9 By relax-
ing the requirements of separation of powers, judiciaries have effected
a reduction in the adjudicatory function of judges and courts. If the
issue of sustaining administrative bodies against the charge of uncon-
stitutional commingling of power were removed from twentieth-
century attitudes toward separation of powers, recognition of affir-
mative encroachment might occur more readily-affirmative in the
sense that judges may be performing functions that could be handled
by administrative agencies or another branch. Affirmative encroach-
ment raises an issue of the interaction of the extent to which judicial
resources and energy can be stretched with the maintenance of an
effective and independent judiciary. The Illinois Supreme Court has
recognized the connection: Separation of powers "does not command
that the judiciary be kept aloof from the general operation of govern-
ment beyond the point necessary to preserve judicial independence and
to avoid the dissipation of energy which should be conserved for
judicial duties." '40
Separation of powers, as a concept in the United States, raises a
number of other issues. How delimiting is the concept in state con-
stitutional law? Does the guarantee of a "Republican Form of
Government" in the United States Constitution require separation of
powers at the state level?"' Does separation of governmental powers
538, 129 So. 876, 881 (1930): "The essential nature and effect of the governmental function to
be performed, rather than the name given to the function or to the officer who performs it,
should be considered in determining whether the particular function is a 'power of government'
within the meaning of the Constitution; and, if it is such a 'power,' whether it is legislative, exe-
cutive, or judicial in its nature, so that it may be exercised by appropriate officers of the proper
department. If a duty or function required by law to be performed is not one of 'the powers of
government' that is or must be assigned to only one department and that cannot be exercised by
those 'properly belonging to' another department, 'except in cases expressly provided for by the
Constitution,' then the Legislature may by statute authorize or require the performance of such
governmental duty or function by those 'properly belonging to' any of the three departments,
provided such a performance of such statutory duty or function is not inconsistent with appli-
cable provisions or principles of organic law."
': E.g., may workers' claims for compensation for job-related injuries be heard and
adjudicated by an administrative body, rather than a court? The answer generally has been affir-
mative.
,° People v. Reiner, 6 Ill. 2d 337, 129 N.E.2d 159, 162 (1955).
41 U.S. CoNsr. art. 4, § 4 provides in part: "Republican Form of Government-Protec-
tion of States. The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a Republican Form
of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion." For a discussion of separation
of powers and the guarantee of a "republican form of government," compare Van Sickle v.
Shanahan, 212 Kan. 426, 511 P.2d 223 (1973) and In re Interrogatories Propounded by Senate,
etc., 189 Colo. 1, 536 P.2d 327 (1975). See also Rice v. Foster, 4 Del. (4 Harv.) 479 (1847); State
ex rel. Foote v. City of Hutchison, 93 Kan. 405, 144 P. 241 (1914); In re Davis, 168 N.Y. 89, 61
[Vol. 34:207
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apply to government below the state level?42 Assume an extreme situa-
tion: A state constitution contains a separation of powers clause
dividing the powers of government into executive, legislative, and
judicial. A constitutional amendment is approved by the required pro-
cedure to the effect that "all powers of government are consolidated
into a single person, and all former departments of government are
abolished." Would such an amendment be "constitutional"? Under
state law? Under the United States Constitution?
A number of state constitutions impose procedural limitations on
the amendment process, e.g.: "When more than one amendment shall
be submitted at the same election, such amendments shall be so sub-
mitted as to enable the electors to vote on each amendment separately
.... Not more than five amendments shall be submitted at the same
election."" 3 If judicially challenged, any amendment approved con-
trary to these limitations presumably would be held invalid as being
N.E. 118 (1901); Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Or. 118, 74 P. 710 (1903). On the relation between
separation of powers and "political" questions, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 222-26,
241-43, 297-98 (1966); Pacific Telephone Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 150 (1912); Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42 (1849); Murphy v. Collins, 20 Ill. App. 3d 181, 312 N.E.2d 772, 783 (Ct.
App. 1974).
,2 Of the states that have considered whether separation of powers is a universal govern-
mental principle throughout the state, or a limited concept applying only to state government,
the overwhelming majority have not applied the restriction to county and municipal govern-
ments. The notable exception may be Michigan-"may be" because the most recent separation
of powers clause apparently has not been interpreted on the issue. MICH. CONsT. art. 3, § 2. The
predecessors of the current Michigan provision have been applied to local governmental units
because, as the Michigan Supreme Court has repeated on a number of occasions, "if there is any
ambiguity, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the traditional separation of governmental
powers." Detroit Osteopathic Hosp. Corp. v. City of Southfield, 377 Mich. 128, 139 N.W.2d
728, 732 (1966), citing Township of Dearborn v. Dearborn Township Clerk, 334 Mich. 673, 55
N.W.2d 201, 208 (1952), which quoted language from Michigan Civil Service Comm'n v.
Auditor General, 302 Mich. 673, 5 N.W.2d 536, 540 (1942). In contrast, California has refused
to apply the doctrine below the state levels not only because local governments were not in exist-
ence at the time the constitution was adopted but also because of the underlying policy of the
concept: "The mischief, however, against which they [the drafters of the Constitution] sought to
provide, did not come from inferior or subordinate officers, but from the higher grades, in
whose hands the first and leading powers of the government were vested. So far as the former
were concerned, they were sufficiently under the control of the latter. Abuse of power could not
come from the former in such measure as to destroy or overthrow the liberties of the people, ex-
cept by direction or connivance of the latter. To surround the latter with checks was a sufficient
protection against the former. Hence the framers of American Constitutions were content with
checks upon the latter, leaving the former, as we consider, to be regulated by the legislative
department." People v. Provines, 34 Cal. 520, 527 (1868). See also State ex rel. Simpson v. City
of Mankato, 117 Minn. 458, 136 N.W. 264, 267 (1912); State ex rel. Sahley v. Thompson, 151
W. Va. 336, 151 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1966). Even where separation of powers is not imposed con-
stitutionally on local government, a state may apply the doctrine below the state level by inclu-
sion of appropriate language in municipal charters and the like. Cf. Wicomico County v. Todd,
256 Md. 459, 260 A.2d 328, 331-32 (1970).
4 KAN. CONST. art. 14, § 1.
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unconstitutional. A constitution could be amended, of course, to alter
or remove the procedural limitations, thereby permitting adoption of a
desired amendment; however, a two-step process would be in-
volved-deletion of the procedural limitation and subsequent adoption
of the amendment. Could not the principle of separation of powers, as
embodied in state constitutions, arguably contain a procedural limita-
tion on amendment, that is, no amendment to the constitution may
destroy the basic separation of powers structure? Would such a limita-
tion, however, be contrary to the idea that the people have the power
to determine the form of their government? Arguably not, because a
case can be made that a basic change in the structure of government
should be effected only within the confines of the constitutional con-
vention process; again a two-step process would be involved-initially
convening a constitutional convention and then effecting the structural
change in a new constitution adopted by a vote of the people. If this
line of analysis were accepted, the fundamental structure of govern-
ment would be protected from unintended or precipitous encroach-
ment.
A court could, thus, declare a fundamental, structural change (as
hypothesized above) attempted by the amendment process "unconsti-
tutional," as contrary to procedural limitations imposed by separation
of powers. How far can the "unconstitutional" amendment rationale
be stretched? If a court were able to invalidate an extreme amendment
as fundamentally offensive to separation of powers, might not less ex-
treme amendments also be struck down? The answer is arguably yes,
as a less extreme amendment might be held unconstitutional, if when
considered collectively with other proposed or approved amendments,
it were to have the effect of posing a fundamental threat to the in-
dependence of one branch or another. A fortiori legislation of this
nature could be invalidated."
One can argue that greater latitude to redefine the allocation of
powers and functions between the three branches exists if the framers
of a separation of powers clause envisioned that exceptions to the
" With respect to judicial independence and efficiency, the cumulative effect of affir-
mative encroachment (see text accompanying notes 38 and 40 supra) must be recognized and ad-
dressed. At what point do judiciaries become so burdened with additional duties that their ability
to function becomes impaired or endangered? How long may courts continue to accept functions
(which should or could be performed by persons within ihe other branches of government)
before the roles and independence of the executive and legislative also are affected? If affir-
mative encroachment results from legislative action, judicial invalidation for inconsistency with
separation of powers is on firm ground; if the constitutional amendment process is the source, a
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separation of powers were included at the time of ratification or could
be added by amendment. This, intent could be evidenced by including
in the separation of powers clause delimiting language (e.g., "except
as otherwise provided in this constitution"). Even under this cir-
cumstance, however, an amendment as extreme as that suggested, or
amendments which taken collectively pose a fundamental threat to
separation of powers, could be subject to invalidation.4
Is an official act performed by a judge in violation of separation
of powers nugatory? The form of the separation of powers clause may
affect the answer. If no proscription in terms of personal conduct is
included," an argument can be made that although a judge could not
be required to perform a function arguably not judicial, the function,
," The argument that a specific provision of a state constitution might be struck down as
violative of the constitution's separation of powers clause found support in 1976. The Illinois
Supreme Court considered in In re Estate of Barker, 63 Ill. 2d 113, 345 N.E.2d 484 (1976),
whether section 4(d) of the Transition Schedule of the 1970 Illinois constitution ("Until other-
wise provided by law ... the Circuit Courts shall continue to exercise the non-judicial functions
vested by law in county courts or the judges thereof") was inconsistent with ILL. CONST. art. 2,
§ 1 (Separation of Powers) ("The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No
branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another"). Although finding no inconsis-
tency, the court did squarely address the issue and was forced to resort to a historical basis to
support its decision: The authority of county courts to perform nonjudicial functions arose out
of the 1870 ILL. CONST. art. 3, a qualified separation of powers clause (i.e., it contained the
delimiting language, "except as hereinafter expressly directed or permitted"), and art. 6, § 18
("County courts ... shall have original jurisdiction in all matters of probate ... and such other
jurisdiction as may be provided for by general law."), which, according to judicial interpretation
(Department of Public Welfare v. Hass, 15 Ill. 2d 204, 154 N.E.2d 265 (1958)), permitted assign-
ment of nonjudicial functions by law to county courts. In 1962, ILL. CONST. art. 6, Schedule 5(a)
amended the judicial article of the 1870 Illinois constitution so as to abolish county courts and
transfer the nonjudicial functions of county courts to circuit courts/judges; the separation of
powers clause of the 1870 Illinois constitution remained, however, qualified. In 1964 the non-
judicial function in question-assessment of inheritance taxes-was transferred statutorily to the
circuit courts from the then-defunct county courts. In 1970, when Illinois adopted a new con-
stitution, separation of powers was made absolute (see ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 1, above) and the
qualifying language ("except as herein . . ."), which had provided part of the basis for judicial
performance of nonjudicial functions by county courts, was deleted. In the Barker case, assess-
ment of inheritance taxes by circuit courts was challenged, as well as section 4(d) of the Transi-
tion Schedule (above), as violative of separation of powers as written in the 1970 Illinois con-
stitution. The Illinois Supreme Court determined that the Constitutional Convention intended to
permit continued exercise of these nonjudicial functions by circuit courts, separation of powers
notwithstanding. The conclusion was aided by the Convention's rejection of a proposal to re-
quire the General Assembly to reassign the nonjudicial functions no later than January 1, 1972.
Although the court's interpretation of the historical precedents can be questioned, the notewor-
thy fact is that the justices did not sidestep the issue by such maxims of interpretation as
"specific governs the general," "later in time prevails," etc. The court squarely faced the ques-
tion of whether section 4(d) was inconsistent with the separation of powers violation. Whether a
different result would have occurred if the historical background had been different is open to
speculation.
46 See text accompanying notes 25-34 supra.
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if performed, would be binding and valid 47-personal conduct not be-
ing proscribed. If, on the other hand, a state's separation of powers is
reinforced by a personal proscription-'"no person exercising the func-
tions of one of the branches shall assume or discharge the duties of
any other"-a different conclusion can be argued. The emphatic pro-
scription could be interpreted as reflecting a constitutional mandate
that judges "not only not be required but shall not be permitted to
exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not
pertaining to or connected with the administering of the judicial func-
tion." 48 To discourage judges from undertaking functions not judicial
in nature,' 9 a state supreme court might hold acts so performed to be
invalid. Several states, among them Maryland5" and California, have
held actions void "for the reason that the court, being a part of the
Judicial Department of the State Government, was prohibited from
exercising executive functions by . . .the Constitution.""
4" Counsel in Board of Supervisors v. Todd, 97 Md. 247, 258, 54 A. 963 (1903) argued
this position Fnd cited State v. Chase, 9 Md. (5 H. & J.) 242, 247 (1821) as precedent; however,
subsequent to the Chase decision, the Maryland constitution was amended to include a proscrip-
tion in terms of personal conduct.
4 97 Md. 247, 264, 54 A. 963 (1903).
4 Judges would also be dissuaded from violating separation of powers, if the constitu-
tional implementation of the concept were to carry "a self-executing penalty to the extent that
when a member of one of the governmental departments trespassess into the domain of another
coordinated branch his office is thereby automatically vacated by reason of those constitutional
provisions, without more." Wilentz ex re. Golat v. Stanger, 129 N.J.L. 606, 30 A.2d 885,
888-89 (1943). The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals (predecessor to the New Jersey
Supreme Court), in finding no such "self-executing penalty," provided an interesting insight:
"A simple reading discloses that there is no authority, either specific or implied, within the
quoted provisions for the vacating of office. It requires no legal training to perceive that the pro-
visions of article III, par. 1 weigh equally upon the several branches. The restraints are upon the
executive and the judicial no less than upon the legislative. Let us assume that a judge makes a
pronouncement which an adversely affected party conceives to belong exclusively to the law-
making branch; an appeal is taken; the appellate court measures the issue in terms of the con-
stitution and determines that the judicial act was in fact a trespass upon the legislative branch
and sets it aside. Article III, par. 1 has been first violated and then sustained; but has the offend-
ing judge vacated his office? Such a supposition is not too far afield. In In re Freeholders of
Hudson Counly, 105 N.J.L. 57, 143 A. 536 [1928], the Supreme Court dismissed upon the
ground, in par, that the statute there disputed was within the legislative domain and the courts
must not enter therein; but there was respectable dissent; and if the dissenting view had there
prevailed, only to be reversed by the court of last resort, would those justices who had under-
taken to enter the legislative field thereby have vacated their offices in the judicial branch? A like
hypothesis might be grounded upon misuse of authority, however unintentional, by the gover-
nor, in such an instance nor the judges in the questions last posed would be held to have vacated
their offices or be subjected to a writ of ouster for such an unconstitutional act."
10 See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Todd, 97 Md. 247, 265-66, 54 A. 963 (1903).
11 See, e.g., People v. Provines, 34 Cal. 520, 526 (1868), restating the California
Supreme Court's holding in Burgoyne v. Board of Supervisors, 5 Cal. 9 (1855). See also Dickey
v. Hurlbert, 5 Cal. 343 (1855). The Provines case overruled, inter alia, these decisions to the ex-
tent inconsistent with the court's rethinking of California's separation of powers clause (i.e., as
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A different conclusion arguably might result if the separation of
governmental powers were cast in the emphatic form (e.g., the powers
of government shall be divided into executive, legislative, and
judicial") and the proscription were in a less forceful form (e.g., "no
person may. . ."). The argument would be, of course, that as the pro-
scription is permissive (in contradistinction to the separation of
powers), the performed act should be sustained. Although semantic
distinctions may be useful (and on occasion determinative), these
should not. Whether an act (not judicial in nature but nevertheless
performed by a judge) is nugatory should depend on how a court
views the constitutional mandate of separation of powers and the ex-
tent to which "rights, privileges, or interests gained by any person,"
5 s2
because of the performance of the act, would be affected. A balancing
of the effects of separation of powers and due process considerations
can only be accomplished on a case-by-case basis.
After addressing the origins of separation of powers, as well as
appreciating the kinds of potential issues and likely areas for inter-
pretation posed by the concept, one must eventually reach the basic
issue: What does "judicial power" mean in the context of separation
of powers? If state judges are limited in the performance of their
duties to judicial powers, and if restrictions and consequences are im-
posed on variance from the norm, the issue-"What is judicial
power?"-must be confronted.
Judicial Power: General
Identification of the parameters of judicial power has occupied
the attention of commentators and courts throughout American legal
history; 3 on occasion some have refused even to undertake the effort54
because of the intrinsic difficulties involved. Within a general concep-
tual framework judges are, of course, expected to perform judicial
rethought, does not apply to local government, and at the state level only constitutional officers
are restricted). However, the Burgoyne and Dickey decisions, as precedent for voiding an act in
violation of separation of powers, do not seem to be affected by the Provines decision.
52 75 OKLA. STAT. § 308(g) (Supp. 1980).
" See, e.g., T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONA. LIMITATIONS 109 (6th ed. 1890) and the com-
mentators listed in LeRoy v. Special Indep. School Dist. No. 1, 285 Minn. 236, 172 N.W.2d 764,
768 (1969); State v. Blaisdell, 22 N.D. 86, 132 N.W. 769, 773 (1911); Wheeler ex rel. Boulanger
v. Morin, 93 N.H. 40, 35 A.2d 513, 518-20 (1943) (dissent); State ex rel. Richardson v. County
Court, 138 W. Va. 885, 78 S.E.2d 569, 574 (1953); Tite v. State Tax Comm'n, 89 Utah 404, 57
P.2d 734, 737 (1936). See also Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Mississippi Service Corp., 135 F. Supp. 304,
308 (S.D. Miss. 1955).
14 See, e.g., State ex rel. Richardson v. County Court, 138 W. Va. 885, 78 S.E.2d 569,
574 (1953).
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functions; however, not all functions of a "judicial" nature are per-
formed" by persons within the judicial branch.
Quasi-judicial functions-a designation arguably only appro-
priate when reference is made to the performance of judicial-type acti-
vities by persons outside the judicial branch" 6-are undertaken on a
routine basis by administrative agencies and, in some instances, by
executive and legislative officials.5 7 The constitutionality and propriety
of negative encroachments on judicial power obviously are of concern,
but so also are those of affirmative encroachment."8 Criteria that de-
limit the field into which the judiciary should enter must, therefore, not
only isolate judicial power but also address the extent to which judges
(and, thus, courts) may act quasi-legislatively and quasi-executively.
Although performance by the judiciary of functions not judicial
in nature raises separation of powers considerations, affirmative en-
croachment also involves practical aspects, for example, efficient
utilization of judicial resources and preservation of judicial indepen-
dence and integrity. Time and personnel are primary judicial re-
sources: if judges and courts perform duties not judicial in nature,
priorities must be set and resources stretched. Which function is to be
undertaken first? How much time and personnel should be commit-
ted? Implications of the second practical consequence-preservation
" See, e.g., discussion of the Florida Supreme Court in Scholastic Systems, Inc. v.
LeLoup, 307 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1974) (worker's compensation).
56 Restriction of "quasi-judicial" to functions performed by persons outside the judicial
branch has judicial support. See, e.g., In re Courthouse of Okmulgee County, 58 Okla. 683, 161
P. 200, 201 (191.6): "A quasi judicial duty is one lying in the judgment or discretion of an officer
olher than a judicial officer. When such an officer is charged with looking into and acting upon
facts not in a way which the law specifically directs, but after a discretion in its nature judicial,
the function is termed 'quasi judicial.' "
" The evolution of the terminology "quasi-executive," "quasi-legislative," and "quasi-
judicial" is closely related to the development of administrative law. This nexus was recognized
by Justice Jacl.;on in FTC v. Ruberiod Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (dissent): "Administrative
agencies have become a fourth branch of government which has deranged our 3 branch legal
theories much as the concept of a fourth dimension unsettles our three dimensional thinking....
Administrative agencies have been called quasi-legislative, quasi-executive and quasi-judicial, as
the occasion required in order to validate their functions within the separation of powers
scheme. The mere retreat to 'quasi' is implicit as a confession that all recognized classifications
have broken down; and 'quasi' is a smooth cover which we draw over our confusion." As to the
meaning of "quasi-judicial," the Florida Supreme Court observed in Canney v. Board of Public
Instruction, 278 So. 2d 260, 263-64 (Fla. 1973): "The characterization of a decision-making pro-
cess ... as 'quasi-judicial' does not make the body into a judicial body. The correct understand-
ing of the terminology 'quasi-judicial' means only that the School Board is acting under certain
constitutional sirictures which have been enforced upon all administrative boards and not that
the School Board has become a part of the judicial branch. To hold otherwise would be to com-
bine the legislative and judicial functions in one body clearly contrary to the separation of
powers doctrine."
58 See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
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of judicial independence and integrity-may be even more note-
worthy. By performing functions extraneous to judicial power, judges
and courts increase the possibility of political entanglement, impair
impartiality, raise partisan suspicions, 9 and generally cultivate ques-
tions of "conflicts of interest, self-aggrandizement, concentration of
power, and dilution of separation of powers." ' 0 To paraphrase the
late Justice Tom Clark, judges should hesitate to do anything that may
come home to "roost," and for judges such matters come home to
roost as lawsuits. 6 '
Courts evolved most likely because of a necessity for some agency
of government to decide controversies-a function that requires inter-
pretation of the law. A duty does not fall within judicial power,
however, merely because an interpretation of the law is required; for
example, in the executive branch a person "cannot execute a law until
he determines what the law means and calls for." 6 Preconceptions as
to what is or is not judicial may be attributable, to a great extent, to
tradition. As the Utah Supreme Court has observed:
[T]he more one cogitates on the nature of three powers, the more con-
vinced he becomes of the proposition that many of the powers of each
branch and especially of the judiciary are traditional, that is, handed
down through the ages, rather than inherently different. Certain func-
" While Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Benjamin Cardozo observed
that the "policy at the root of the constitutional prohibition is to conserve the time of the judges
for the performance of their work as judges, and to save them from entanglements, [and] at
times the partisan suspicions, so often the result of other and conflicting duties." In re Richard-
son, 247 N.Y. 401, 160 N.E. 655, 661 (1928). Although the Chief Judge was specifically referring
to New York's constitutional prohibition against judicial dual office holding, his comments are
equally applicable to policies supportive of separation of powers.
60 Begick v. Jefferson, 441 P.2d 27, 35 (Alas. 1968). Prohibitions against members of the
"three separate branches of state government holding any other position ... reflect ... the in-
tent to guard against conflict of interests, self-aggrandizement, concentration of power, and
dilution of separation of powers in regard to the exercise of powers governmental officials of the
executive, judicial, and legislative functions of... state government. The rationale underlying
such prohibitions can be attributed to the desire to encourage and preserve independence and
integrity of action and decision on the part of the individual members of... state government."
Id.
61 Hearings on Nonjudicial Activities of the Supreme Court Justices and Other Federal
Judges Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (1969). See also Council of the Tenth Circuit, 382 U.S. 1003 (1966) and
398 U.S. 74 (1970) (Judicial Councils); Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967); S.
Res. 1097, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 4299 (1969); H.R. 5146, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1946), reprinted in N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1946, at E-7, col. 7; Report, Independence of Judges:
Should They Be Used for Non-Judicial Work? 33 A.B.A.J. 792, 795 (1947) (United States
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary); Adams, No Outside Work for Supreme Court Justices, 9 ALA.
LAwv. 468 (1948); Ervin, Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 L. & CoNTEMP. PROB.
108, 122 (1970).
62 Tite v. State Tax Comm'n, 89 Utah 404, 57 P.2d 734, 737 (1936).
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tions the courts exercised because they were first given to the courts or
because they developed the machinery to handle them, and the person
who presided over them was a specialist in the law, or a lawyer."
Institutions in government, other than the judiciary, may possess at
present adequate machinery or have access to legally trained persons
so as to permit a reevaluation of "What is judicial?" To paraphrase
an expression of future interests, how long should the hand from the
grave control the present?
Notwithstanding the dynamics of the law, judges continue to
look to the past to find content for judicial power, or, as the Minne-
sota Supreme Court has observed, "A recognized test of whether a
function is judicial is whether it is one that courts have historically
been accustomed to perform.' '64 Reflecting the same line of thought,
the Supreme Court of West Virginia, although admitting that a par-
ticular function assigned to and being undertaken by the judiciary was
"essentially legislative, not judicial in nature," ' 61 affirmed, in result
and rationale, despite serious separation of powers misgivings, an
earlier decision that had upheld judicial participation on the grounds
of public policy:
Where property or other substantial rights have been acquired on [the]
strength of court decisions, and where to overrule such decisions would
create confusion and lead to litigation, and where no serious, public or
private consequences would result from following even an unsound rul-
ing, the doctrine of "stare decisis" should be applied."
Due process and property rights must be protected, of course, but
judges often apply rulings prospectively, rejecting retroactivity for the
OS Id. (emphasis added).
64 LeRoy v. Special Indep. School Dist. No. 1, 285 Minn. 236, 172 N.W.2d 764, 768
(1969).
" Wiseman v. Calvert, 134 W. Va. 303, 59 S.E.2d 445, 452 (1950), aff'g In re Proposal
to Incorporate Town of Chesapeake, 130 W. Va. 527, 45 S.E.2d 113 (1947).
11 In re Proposal to Incorporate Town of Chesapeake, 130 W. Va. 527, 45 S.E.2d 113,
114 (1947) (Court Syllabus 2), aff'd Wisemann v. Calvert, 134 W. Va. 303, 59 S.E.2d 445, 452
(1950) (emphasis added). See also In re Opinion of the Justices, 8 Ter. 117, 88 A.2d 128, 139
(Del. 1952): "[T]hese [the court had listed a number of functions assigned to and being per-
formed by the judiciary] are sufficient to establish the existence of a practice, extending back at
least a century and a half, under our three constitutions, of requiring the members of the
judiciary to perform non-judicial duties-in most cases duties wholly unrelated to the courts or
to the judicial function. We are cited to no decision of any Delaware court denying or even ques-
tioning the power of the General Assembly in this regard. . . .The chain of legislative enact-
ments above mentioned over a very long period of time affords a practical construction, by the
people of the State through their representatives, of the doctrine of separation of powers under
our constitutions-a construction reinforced by the apparent tacit recognition by bench and bar




very reasons expressed by the West Virginia Supreme Court. This kind
of concern, although worthy of note, should not be used as a basis for
refusing to correct errors in judicial judgment; longevity of a proposi-
tion of law should not foreclose a reconsideration:
From our consideration of this matter we are of the opinion that the
only possible basis for conceding contemporary validity to this 1360
statute is its age and the age of certain ill-considered text comments, a
variation of the supposition that "whatever is is right." We choose,
however, to conclude that civil rights are not lost by historical default;
that error compounded by error remains nonetheless error. Age alone
certainly does not render a statute invalid; nor does the fact that it was
adopted in and for different times and purposes. Conversely, however,
age alone cannot insulate a statute from attack when in different time
and social context and in different constitutional milieu it is in irrecon-
cilable conflict with concepts of individual rights and criminal law.
67
A conclusion that one may reasonably draw is that a function is not
within judicial power merely because the legislature assigned the duty
to the judiciary, or because the judiciary has been performing the
function without objection, or because no one during the period in
which a statute has been in force-whether a year, a decade, or cen-
turies-has judicially challenged the enactment.
Constitutional and Legislative Sources
Although statements similar to that of the Maryland Court of
Appeals-'"The mere fact that a Judge is called on by statute to exe-
cute a certain function does not make the function a judicial function.
... The qualities of the act, and not the character of the actor must
6, Commonwealth v. Franklin, 172 Pa. Super. 152, 92 A.2d 272, 291 (Super. Ct. 1952).
See also Chief Justice Marble's dissent in Wheeler ex rel. Boulanger v. Morin, 93 N.H. 40, 35
A.2d 513, 519-20 (1943): "[Nleither pre-constitutional usage nor post-constitutional enactments
can be invoked to prove that the framers of the Constitution considered the... [function] to be
a judicial duty. To attach significance to the pre-constitutional practice of delegating executive
powers to the judiciary is to disregard the constitutional purpose of abolishing these practices,
and to assign importance to post-constitutional legislation is to ignore the discussions in the
cases. [Citations omitted.] The fact that these early enactments have never been assailed does not
tend to establish their validity. [Citations omitted.] Chief Justice Doe has said we cannot look
with confidence 'to the period immediately succeeding the Revolution for judicial precedents,'
that the people, 'few in number, recovering laboriously from the effects of the war, concerned
themselves with practical results,' that they had 'little leisure for seeking grievances in mere for-
mal defects of their own legislation,' that they were 'largely controlled in their views of public
affairs by their pre-constitutional usages' and 'were satisfied with customary modes' that 'did
not appear to them substantially inequitable.' [Citations omitted.] Judge Peaslee has declared
that the legislation of this period as a whole 'reveals what to-day seems to be an amazing
disregard of the plainest principles.' "
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determine the nature of the act" 6S-seem almost definitional, state
judges have not guarded against affirmative encroachment. The in-
crease in functions held constitutionally to be permissible for assign-
ment to the judiciary has occurred under rationales such as that given
by the Ohio Supreme Court a number of years ago:
[T]his fact alone, of conferring on a judicial tribunal in the first in-
stance the power to act in a given matter, is of controlling importance
in giving judicial character to the nature of the power, though that is
not necessarily a conclusive test, for, if it were, the existence of a
statute would establish its validity; but it is decisive in that respect,
unless it is reasonably certain that the power belongs exclusively to the
legislative or executive department .... "The legislature, by conferring
any particular power upon a court, virtually declares that it considers it
a power which may most appropriately be exercised under the modes
and forms of judicial proceedings." ' 69
A function should not be designated as within "judicial power" and,
thus, permissible for assignment to the judicial branch, simply because
the reviewing court is unable to say that the duties are "exclusively"
legislative or executive. Again, as observed by Chief Judge Benjamin
Cardozo, "[C]enturies of common-law tradition warn us with echoing
impressiveness that [some things are not] . . . judge's work." 70 For
whatever reasons-institutional ego, personal ambition, practical
necessity, avoidance of potential constitutional crises, or simply an
inability to say no-American judiciaries, as a whole, have permitted
affirmative encroachment to thrive. If this trend is to be recognized
and addressed effectively, a concise, manageable concept of judicial
power is required-a criterion beyond nonexclusivity with regard to
the other branches of government.
The commentators and courts who have formed definitions of
judicial power have generally used adjudication as the central theme:
Judge Cooley: "to adjudicate upon and protect the rights and inter-
ests of individual citizens, and to that end to construe and apply the
law." 7'
Michigan Supreme Court: "the power to decide cases between con-
6" Board of Supervisors v. Todd, 97 Md. 247, 252, 54 A. 963 (1903), quoting Robey v.
Prince George's County, 92 Md. 150, 48 A. 48, 51 (1900).
"9 City of Zanesville v. Zanesville Tel. & Tel. Co., 64 Ohio St. 67, 59 N.E. 781, 786
(1901), quoting State v. Harmon, 31 Ohio St. 250, 259 (1877), which had approved the principle
as stated in In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. (8 Smity) 81, 84 (1960).
10 In re Richardson, 247 N.Y. 401, 160 N.E. 655, 658 (1928).




tending parties and to determine legal rights in other cases where per-
mitted by law."
72
North Dakota Supreme Court: "authority vested in some court, offi-
cer, or person to hear and determine when the rights of persons or
property or the propriety of doing an act, are the subject-matter of
adjudication."3
Federal District Court (S.D. Miss.): "the legal right, ability, and
authority, to hear and decide a justiciable issue or controversy." 74
Although adjudication appears to be the heart of judicial power, a
fact must be realized-not all adjudications are required to be per-
formed by the judiciary. Chief Justice Vanderbilt, speaking for the
New Jersey Supreme Court, concluded:
The failure to comprehend that administrative adjudication is not
judicial springs from the erroneous notion that all adjudication is
judicial. This is not so and never has been so.... Were the rule other-
wise and were every executive, administrative, legislative, or municipal
adjudication deemed judicial and the official or body making the adju-
dication regarded as a judge or a court, we should be driven to treat
every public official in the State, from the Governor to the members of
a local board of adjustment passing on a zoning question, or of a board
of education trying a school teacher on charges, as a judge or a
court-a conclusion so extravagant that its mere statement demon-
strates its fallaciousness as well as its undesirability. Once the obvious
right of the Governor and the Legislature, each to adjudicate within his
or its own proper sphere, is recognized and it is conceded that the
courts are not the exclusive instrumentalities for adjudication, the true
nature of the administrative adjudications, commonly termed "quasi-
judicial," becomes apparent. This term serves to characterize not the
quality of the adjudication but its origin outside the judicial branch of
the government."
The judiciary also is not the exclusive residence of application of
discretion and judgment. 6 Likewise, the requirement of fact-finding,
in and of itself, does not necessarily place a function within judicial
12 Judges for Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne, 383 Mich. 10, 172 N.W.2d
436, 439 (1969).
73 State v. Blaisdell, 22 N.D. 86, 132 N.W. 769, 773 (1911).
7' Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Mississippi Service Corp., 135 F. Supp. 304, 308 (S.D. Miss.
1955).
"' Milhearn v. Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 2 N.J. 356, 66 A.2d 726, 730
(1949), quoted in David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 212 A.2d 345, 357-58 (1965).
76 See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisors of Assessment, 276 Md. 36, 343 A.2d 521, 526
(1975).
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power." As a result, one can argue that not all functions that require
adjudication, exercise of discretion or judgment, or fact-finding must
necessarily be within judicial power. Yet, where can the line be drawn?
It may be possible to make the demarcation by characterizing the end
product of the process: If the result of an adjudication is basically
legislative, e.g., the incorporation of a town, the process by which the
determination is achieved, including fact-finding and exercise of
discretion or judgment, is the responsibility of the legislative depart-
ment. If the determination is primarily executive, e.g., a decision to
grant or deny a license, the decision-making process should be carried
out by a person in an executive position. Determination of which exe-
cutive or legislative resources should be committed to perform execu-
tive or legislative adjudication, fact-finding, and exercise of discretion
or judgment is not for the judiciary to decide; the wisdom, necessity
and expediency of legislative78 or executive action, as contradis-
tinguished from its constitutionality, are not the province of the
judicial branch. Involvement of the judiciary in processes that are
principally executive or legislative in nature arguably should be limited
to appellate review.79
, See also Dal Maso v. Board of County Comm'rs, 182 Md. 200, 34 A.2d 464, 467
(1943); State e.% rel. Gale v. Ueland, 30 Minn. 29, 14 N.W. 58, 59 (1882). But cf. Harrell v.
Coursen, 234 Ga. 350, 216 S.E.2d 105, 107 (1975); Beasly v. Ridout, 94 Md. 641, 52 A. 61, 66
(1902).
" A particularly well written restatement of this proposition was provided by the Utah
Supreme Court in Trade Comm'n v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958,
963 (1968): "It does not lie within the province of the court to pass upon the wisdom, the need
or the desirability of any legislation, nor to choose between two opposing philosophies. It is not
the function of Ihe court to ameliorate the conditions of those in want, nor is its purpose to solve
the economic, social or religious problems and dissension which beset society. The court is not
the conscience of the State or its people. It does not fall within its duty to express the personal
desires or philosophy of its personnel. The court does not determine who is large or who is small
nor who is rich or who is poor. It operates upon a state of facts to effect justice between
contending parties and interests all in accordance with established legal and equitable rules and
regulations. The court must voluntarily restrain itself by holding strictly to an exercise and ex-
pression of its delegated or innate power to interpret and adjudicate. We have been called upon
to state what the law is and not what we think it should be. The question as to whether the
statute in question is or is not economically sound or beneficial is not for the court to decide, but
such an inquiry is a matter for the legislature. The only question for us is to determine whether
or not the particular statute in question is constitutional." Because the proposition that
American courts do not inquire into the wisdom of legislative action is so universally accepted,
no further citations are provided.
" Judicial review of a determination primarily executive or legislative in nature should
be a procedural, not a substantive, review. As a former Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals stated: "In cases of great technological complexity, the best way for courts to guard
against unreasonable or erroneous administrative decisions is not for the judges themselves to
scrutinize the technical merits of each decision. Rather, it is to establish a decision-making pro-
cess which assures a reasoned decision that can be held up to the scrutiny of the scientific com-
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol34/iss2/2
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In view of the development of administrative agencies and in-
creased resources of the other branches of government, judiciaries
realistically should be able to evaluate their present duties as adjudica-
tors/fact finders/discretion-judgment exercisers with regard to func-
tions falling primarily (although perhaps not exclusively) within the
province of the other governmental departments. Content may thus be
able to be given to the word "judicial" by the process of elimination.
If the end-product of a procedure is primarily executive or legislative,
judicial resources arguably should not be committed except to fulfill
the judiciary's responsibility of appellate review.
Inherent Power
To complete the analysis of judicial power, one must inquire,
however, whether the judiciary possesses inherent power. The answer
is yes; however, its inherent power arguably is not adjudicatory in
nature but rather administrative or ministerial, and exists only "in the
sense that it is a natural necessary concomitant to the judicial power
.. It does not deal with justiciable matters. It relates to the ad-
ministration of the business of the Court." 8 As the Minnesota
Supreme Court observed in 1976:
[I]nherent judicial power governs that which is essential to the exist-
ence, dignity, and function of the court because it is a court. Its source
munity and the public." International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (Bazelon concurring opinion). But cf. 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Leventhal opi-
nion). For example, if the record on which review is to be based is not sufficient for the court's
purposes (e.g., there is no transcript of testimony or the procedures followed are not clear), the
reviewing court should remand the matter to the agency with instructions to provide either an
adequate record or to cease the agency action. A fortiori a court should not conduct a de nova
review of an agency action executive or legislative in character; judges/courts should not do in-
directly (i.e., de novo review) what would be impermissible directly (initial decision-making). See
Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, -Minn.-, 256 N.W.2d 808, 824 (1977). But cf. Keller v. City of
Albuquerque, 85 N.M. 134, 509 P.2d 1329 (1973). Under contemporary legal theory, courts
generally sustain statutes permitting review de novo of administrative decisions that are quasi-
judicial in nature. See, e.g., Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11
Cal. 3d 28, 520 P.2d 29, 31, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1974); Travis County Bail Bond Bd. v. Smith,
531 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975), citing Gerst v. Nixon, 411 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1966).
One can argue, however, that the judicial department should either insist on adjudicating a par-
ticular kind of controversy (i.e., object to the negative encroachment) or allow the matter to be
decided by the administrative body, subject to limited review. Upon finding that an ad-
ministrative decision cannot stand, a court can return the matter to the administrative agency
with the deficiencies noted, much the same way an appellate court remands a case to a lower
court. The query "Are the judicial resources of time and personnel sufficient to afford the lux-
ury of supporting a dual system of decision (i.e., decision on the merits by two governmental
branches)?" must eventually be addressed.
80 Judges for Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne, 383 Mich. 10, 172 N.W.2d
436, 440 (1969).
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is the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers as expressed and
implied in our constitution. Its scope is the practical necessity of ensur-
ing the free and full exercise of the court's vital function-the disposi-
tion of individual cases to deliver remedies for wrongs and' "justice
freely and without purchase; completely and without denial; promptly
and without delay, conformable to the laws." At bottom, inherent
judicial power is grounded in judicial self-preservation.8 '
Exercise of judicial inherent power should be the exception, not the
rule. One test "to be applied in these cases is whether the relief re-
quested by the court or aggrieved party is necessary to the perfor-
mance of the judicial function as contemplated in [the] . . . constitu-
tion. The test is not relative needs or judicial wants, but practical
necessity in performing the judicial function."
'8 2
Because of inherent power, not only in the judiciary but also in
the other branches of government, an overlapping of governmental
powers must occur. Under separation of powers the judiciary must
exercise quasi-executive and quasi-legislative powers (within narrow
confines) to maintain independence; likewise, the autonomy of the
executive and legislative branches requires additional blending of
powers.8 3 One can argue, however, that no authority exists, under
" In re Clerk of Court's Compensation v. Lyon County Comm'rs, 308 Minn. 172, 241
N.W.2d 781, 784 (1976); The Minnesota Supreme Court continued at 241 N.W.2d at 784: "Ob-
viously, the legislature could seriously hamper the court's power to hear and decide cases or even
effectively abolish the court itself through its exercise of financial and regulatory authority. If
the court has no means of protecting itself from unreasonable and intrusive assertions of such
authority, the separation of powers becomes a myth. The recognition of these truisms has made
the doctrine of inherent judicial power established law in virtually every American jurisdiction."
Similar conclusions have been reached by other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Blitch v.
Buchanan, 100 Fla. 1202, 131 So. 151, 154 (1930); O'Coins, Inc. v. Treasurer of County of Wor-
chester, 362 Mass. 507, 287 N.E.2d 608, 611-12 (1972); Judges for Third Judicial Circuit v.
County of Wayne, 383 Mich. 10, 172 N.W.2d 436, 440 (1969); Gray v. Hakenjas, 366 Mich. 588,
115 N.W.2d 411, 414 (1962); State ex rel. Pfeiffer v. Common Pleas Court of Lorain County, 13
Ohio St. 2d 133, 235 N.E.2d 232, 235 (1968); State ex rel. Finley, Judge v. Pfieffer, 163 Ohio St.
149, 126 N.E.2d 57, 61 (1955); Commonwealth exrel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193,
197 (1971); In re Salary of Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d 232, 552 P.2d 163, 170-71 (1976). But
cf. Commissioners Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 109 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971) ("There is no
such thing as the inherent power of a court. .. ").
11 In re Clerk of Court's Compensation v. Lyon County Comm'rs, 308 Minn. 172, 241
N.W.2d 781, 786 (1976). For a detailed discussion of judicial inherent power, see also 241
N.W.2d at 782-87; In re Salary of Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d 232, 552 P.2d 163, 170-75
(1976).
" The Supreme Court of Nevada expanded this analysis in Galloway v. Truesdell, 83
Nev. 13, 422 P.2d 237, 243 (1967): "In addition to the constitutionally expressed powers and
functions of each Department (the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial), each possesses
inherent and incidental powers that are properly termed ministerial. Ministerial functions are
methods of implementation to accomplish or put into effect the basic function of each depart-
ment. No Department could properly function without the inherent ministerial functions.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol34/iss2/2
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separation of powers, for the executive or legislative departments to
assign administrative or ministerial functions to the judiciary,
unrelated to maintaining judicial independence and integrity.8"
Judicial inherent power (that is, its quasi-executive and quasi-
legislative functions) should be isolated conceptually from other re-
quests made to judges for performance of duties not within judicial
power.
Conclusion
Judges have an obligation not only to check warranted reduction
of judicial power (negative encroachment) but also to reject expansion
of duties assigned to the judiciary by another branch attempting to
commit one of its responsibilities to the judiciary (affirmative en-
croachment), no matter how flattering the display of confidence may
be."5 State judicial decisions rarely raise the question, "Is this the type
of activity in which a member of the judiciary should be involved?"
No suggestion is made that judges should separate themselves from
society and become cloistered, only that they be more aware of the
limitations on judicial power. Although the precise wording of a
definition of "judicial power" is elusive, if not impossible to for-
Without the inherent powers of ministerial functions each Department would exist in a vacuum.
It would be literally helpless. It is because of the inhereni authority of ministerial functions that
the three Departments are thus linked together and able to form a co-ordinated and interdepen-
dent system of government. While the Departments become a coordinated, efficient system
under such a process, yet each Department must maintain its separate autonomy. It is in the area
of ministerial functions of each Department where there frequently occurs an overlapping or
even a duplication of functions. However, the overlapping is more apparent than real. These
seemingly overlapped powers have been termed quasi-legislative, quasi-executive, and quasi-
judicial by students of government. Some of the confusion has been caused by a misuse of the
'quasi' terms, even in decisions of courts, i.e., 'quasi-judicial' should properly only refer to a
legislative or executive activity, and not to a judicial activity. By definition 'quasi' means super-
ficially resembling but intrinsically different. It is when an activity seems to be judicial in nature,
but in reality it is not, that it is termed quasi-judicial. (A better term, perhaps would be pseudo.)
To say that an inherent, incidental judicial function is quasi-judicial is an absolute contradiction
of terms. Such an overlapping or duplication of effort or function can be entirely valid so long
as each can logically and legitimately trace its efforts or functions back to, and it is derived
from, its basic source of power."
" Chief Justice Benjamin Cardozo, in In re Richardson, 247 N.Y. 401, 160 N.E. 655,
657-58 (1928), observed: "From the beginnings of our history, the principle has been enforced
that there is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative [Departments] to charge the
judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of
judicial duties .... Centuries of common-law tradition warn us with echoing impressiveness that
[some things are not] ...judge's work. We should be sorry to weaken that tradition by any
judgment of this court."
11 A similar thought was expressed by the Supreme Court of West Virginia in Hodges v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 110 W. Va. 649, 159 S.E. 834, 837-38 (1931).
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mulate, general guidelines of the concept may be identified. Arguably
judicial power can be divided into three components:
1. The resolution of issues between contending parties to a con-
troversy, the result of which is not a determination primarily executive
or legislative in nature.
2. The exercise of inherent judicial power-the performance of
quasi-executive and quasi-legislative duties to the extent necessary to
insure judicial independence and integrity.
3. The review of actions of the executive and legislative bran-
ches under an appropriate scope and standard of review.
A judiciary may feel constitutionally compelled, of course, to
decide issues not within these general guidelines; however, the occa-
sions for deviation should not be great in number. Although state
courts cannot be expected to designate accurately every function of
government as either judicial, executive, or legislative, judges should
be able to determine that a particular function primarily is not judicial
in nature, leaving the ultimate decision as to its disposition to the other
two branches for resolution. In this manner, affirmative encroachment
may be able to be recognized and addressed effectively.
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